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  In this paper we examine the implication of a simple class of fiscal rules 
for long-run economic growth and welfare. The golden rule of public finance 
(GRPF) that we examine is motivated by institutional arrangements in 
countries such as Germany and the UK. We find that rules which seek to limit 
government borrowing to productive investment spending have a clear 
justification in terms of growth and welfare when government provided goods 
are otherwise excessively provided. Even in the case where it is private 
consumption that is excessive, the GRPF is likely to be good from a growth 
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More and more countries are adopting ﬁscal rules. They may become an impor-
tant feature of the macroeconomic landscape in the same way as central bank
independence has emerged as a dominant institutional arrangement for monetary
policy across an increasing number of countries. Some argue that ﬁscal rules are
a complement to monetary rules—both ultimately aimed at price stability. How-
ever, ﬁscal rules may also have longer term, growth, implications. For example,
recently the Prime Ministers of Italy, Spain, Poland, The Netherlands, Portugal
and Estonia wrote to Bertie Ahern Irish holder of the rotating EU Presidency.
In that letter1 the premiers argued that “[T]he Stability and Growth pact is an
essential element of economic governance...and a necessary condition to sustained
economic growth” (emphasis added)2. And in fact the endogenous growth liter-
ature has indicated that there are indeed long-run growth implications of ﬁscal
policies. But what are the growth and welfare implications of such rules, and
what are the underlying distortions that they seek to address? In this paper we
take a preliminary look at these issues.
1.1. Related Literature
We construct a series of model economies in which the decentralised equilibria
reﬂect a number of externalities. We then identify the circumstances in which
what we call the Golden Rule of Public Finance (motivated by actual ‘rules’
adopted in several countries, notably Germany and the UK), can improve on the
decentralised outcome.
These externalities reﬂect situations where private and government consump-
tion are, in turn, excessive relative to the social optimum, and where the marginal
product of capital is low, while nevertheless reﬂecting a situation of underinvest-
ment in private capital. For simplicity we build these distortions directly into our
baseline model via our assumptions on preferences and production technology. We
view these distortions as proxies for richer political economy-type features. For
1This correspondence was reported in the Financial Times, Tuesday February 17 2004 (Page
8).
2The letter was widely viewed as a rebuke to France and Germany who were breaching at
t h et i m et h e3 %E Ud e ﬁcit guidelines. These two countries persuaded the EU to suspend the
sanctions against excessive deﬁcit countries in November 2003, to the dismay of many of the
other EU countries. The European Central Bank subsequently also made clear its dismay at
the sidelining of the Pact.
2instance, as Drazen (2000, page 380) notes, “... there is no presumption about
whether decision making by majority voting leads to a level of public good provi-
sion either systematically above or below the [social] optimum level.”3 In practice,
the arguments are made both ways. For instance, some have argued that market
economies have a built in dynamic that constrains (some) public good provision to
fall increasingly behind private consumption to the detriment of economic welfare;
this is in part what lies behind Galbraith’s quip concerning ‘private opulence and
public squalor’.4 On the other hand, some have argued that the public sector in
market economies, under the inﬂuence of pressure group activity, has a tendency to
grow too big (James Buchanan, 19725). Ultimately, governments may be tempted
to supply goods that the market could otherwise supply, or government activity
may result in the crowding out of productive private investment. More formally,
there has been much empirical and theoretical work aimed at understanding the
size and scope of government, see, for instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995), and
Drazen (2000).
In this paper we focus on a simple class of ﬁscal rules among which is the
Golden Rule of Public Finance, where government borrowing is constrained for
investment purposes only. In other words, the government cannot borrow to boost
its nondurable consumption. Ultimately, ﬁscal rules of the sort analysed here have
two eﬀects. First, they may constrain the overall size of the public sector as mea-
sured by the sum of government spending. In our set up the government supplies
a non-durable, non-rival and non-excludable consumption good, and a rival but
non-excludable investment good. Second, by changing the social cost of a unit
3See also the discussion in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
4See, for example, J. K. Galbraith, The Aﬄuent Society (1987) or Economics and the Public
Purpose (1974) for an articulation of this type of concern. That said, to our knowledge Galbraith
has never recommended ﬁscal rules of the sort analysed in this paper.
5Consider the following remarks by Buchanan: ‘... If political reality is recognized at all (and
it seldom is by academic scribblers), surely it suggests the strong bias of ﬁscal policy toward the
creation of budget deﬁcits rather than budget surpluses. Governments, that is to say, politicians,
faced with any sort of responsive citizenry or electorate, are surely cognizant of two powerful
and ever-present forces. Constant pressure is exerted upon them to reduce (not to increase) the
level of taxes, and, at the same time, to expand (not to reduce) both the range and the extent
of the various public services. ...
Both of the dominant pressure groups, the tax reducers and the expenditure expanders,
direct their ﬁre at the politicians, who must, other things equal, respond (otherwise, they will not
remain politicians for long). These pressures assume especial importance in an economy where
tax rates are already prohibitively high in the view of many people, and where ever-expanding
public spending programmes have been ﬁrmly “built in” to the structure of expectations. ...’
3of public investment the GRPF, ceteris paribus, reduces the amount of the in-
vestment good necessarily below the optimal level. However, the implications for
growth and welfare of our class of ﬁscal rules are not clear cut. For example, if gov-
ernment spending on the non-durable, non-rival and non-excludable consumption
good is suﬃciently high, the imposition of the GRPF may result in suﬃciently
low tax rates such as to compensate for the lower level of the non-excludable in-
vestment good (an input in the production technology). However, the lower level
of the government investment good will also have a direct eﬀe c to ng r o w t hv i at h e
interest rate. Tracing out how these complicated general equilibrium eﬀects work
themselves out in this and the other cases we analyse is a main contribution of
this paper.
O nt h ei s s u eo fﬁscal rules, Greiner and Semmler (2000) is an important pa-
per, which investigates long-run growth performances under alternative budgetary
regimes (in particular, the golden rule of public ﬁnance), in an endogenous growth
model with public capital and public debt. They show that the growth eﬀects of
an increase in public investment depend on the exact budgetary regime within
which the government operates. In particular, they demonstrate that less strict
budgetary regimes do not necessarily imply higher rates of long-run growth. These
authors do not, however, analyse the welfare implications of such budgetary rules.
Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004b), who extend the Greiner and Semmler framework
to include welfare analysis, have studied precisely this aspect. They demonstrate
analytically that welfare-maximising ﬁscal rules diﬀer, depending on whether or
not government borrowing is earmarked to ﬁnance only productive public spend-
ing, and this is in line with the Greiner and Semmler result of growth eﬀects
depending on which particular regime is in place.
However, these papers set to one side two important issues. First, how do
these simple rules aﬀe c tg r o w t ha n dw e l f a r ew h e nc o n g e s t i o ne ﬀects are present?
Second, in the face of what distortions does a ﬁs c a lr u l e( l i k et h eG R P F )m a k e
sense? Turning to the ﬁrst question, we ﬁrst need to establish why it is important
to study congestion-type eﬀects in the ﬁrst place, and what the prominent eﬀects
of ﬁscal policies in such settings are. As argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995), virtually all public services — including perhaps national defence — are
characterised by some degree of congestion. The classic article by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) demonstrates that income taxation operates as a user fee for
rival but non-excludable public goods and prevents the growth rate from being
too high, something that lump-sum taxation cannot achieve. Turnovsky (1997)
captures congestion eﬀects in a model with public capital, and characterises the
4transitional dynamics under alternative ﬁscal policies. He also derives a time-
varying income tax that could enable the decentralised economy to replicate both
the short- and long-run behaviour achievable under a social planner. Fisher and
Turnovsky (1998) show how the eﬀect of government investment on private capital
formation involves a trade-oﬀ between the degree of substitution between private
and public capital in production and the degree of congestion. Here, neither
lump-sum nor distortionary tax ﬁnancing of public investment is optimal.
Turning to the second question, we are not aware of any studies that look at
whether simple ﬁscal rules help ameliorate the welfare implications of the sorts
of issues we have just mentioned. The present paper can be seen, in part, as a
preliminary attempt to address this omission.
As is clear from above, an important aspect of endogenous growth theory over
the years has been the study of how ﬁscal variables, both on the expenditure and
revenue sides, aﬀect the long-run growth rate of an economy. On the expenditure
side, Barro (1990) shows how the presence of productive public services, as an
input in the production function, can aﬀect steady state growth. This seminal
paper by Barro (1990) considers the ﬂow of public services rather than the stock
of public capital. Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) consider the latter, and
demonstrate the existence of a unique steady growth equilibrium with private
and public capital. They also analyse the transitional dynamics of their model.
Departing from the balanced budget set-up of the two papers cited above, Bruce
and Turnovsky (1999), considering an array of ﬁscal instruments, identify the
conditions under which a tax cut (by itself, or with accompanying expenditure
cuts) can improve the long-run government budget balance. They do not, however,
focus on the impact of aggregative ﬁscal rules, despite the growing prominence of
such rules in policy debates. This is what we aim to do in this paper, within a
Bruce and Turnovsky (1999)-type framework.
1.2. Outline of Paper
In the next section we set out a baseline model with conventional assumptions as
regards the preferences of agents, and with congestion eﬀects in the production
technology, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). We then examine the equilib-
rium paths of the model’s key variables and calculate the present value of utility
under a number of scenarios. First, we analyse the decentralised equilibrium when
the purpose of government borrowing is unconstrained. Second, we examine what
happens when the ﬁscal authorities are constrained to borrow only for produc-
5tive purposes (that is to boost the level of the non-excludable investment good).
Finally, we compare these outcomes to the social optimum.
In section 3 we analyse the situation when the decentralised equilibrium is
characterised by excessive private consumption. Again we compare this outcome
to that when the government follows a ﬁscal rule, and under the social optimum.
In section 4 we examine an alternative scenario when the decentralised equilibrium
is characterised by excessive government supply of the non-durable, non-rival and
non-excludable consumption good. In section 5 we look at the case where the de-
centralised equilibrium features underinvestment in the private stock of capital as
compared with the social optimum, and the baseline case of congested production
technology. Section 6 sums up our key results and concludes.
2. Basic Model with Congested Technology
We start oﬀ with a conventional preference and production set up in order to
establish some baseline results. There are a large number of individuals in this
economy, say n. The size of the population, for simplicity, is ﬁxed for all time at
this number. The present value of utility, V ,a n dt h eﬂow utility, U,f o rt h eith











,σ > 0,0 <η<1. (2.1)
Here c denotes per capita consumption, Gc denotes consumption of the government
supplied public good, and ρ is the rate of time preference. Generally we adopt
the convention that X = nx, where lower case letters denote per capita values
while upper case denote economy-wide aggregates. The budget constraint for this
individual is
˙ k + ˙ b =( 1− τ)(y + rb) − c. (2.2)
A dot above a variable denotes a time derivative. k denotes the capital stock, b
denotes government bonds, τ is the tax rate, y is output, and r is the interest
rate. The production technology is described by
y = Ak(GI/K)
β,β > 0. (2.3)
6The production function captures the sense in which there is congestion in public
services, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). GI is aggregate government ex-
penditure on the investment goods. Hence, since it is GI/K that appears in the
production function, the public investment good is rival but not excludable; we
cannot preserve a portion of GI for our own use (hence non-excludable), and the
higher our capital stock is relative to another producer, the smaller are the facili-
ties available for production to that producer (hence rival). As a consequence of
this, we may think of GI as both the per capita level of government expenditure
on the investment good, and the aggregate level of this expenditure. We may
also consider Gc, which is non-rival and non-excludable, to be a per capita and
aggregate quantity.
2.1. The Decentralised Outcome
Throughout the paper we shall assume that initial debt is positive, nb(0) > 0.W e
assume that the usual transversality conditions with respect to bonds and capital
hold. The optimality conditions of the representative household maximising (2.1)





−ρt = λ; (2.4)




˙ λ = −λ(1 − τ)r. (2.6)
In an appendix (available on request) we set out the optimisation problem in
detail and indicate why λ is related to both the dynamic behaviour of bonds and




















7Balanced growth is derived by taking logs of equation (2.4) and diﬀerentiating
with respect to time:
˙ λ
λ
=[ ( 1− η)(1 − σ) − 1]
˙ c
c




Along the balanced growth path (˙ c/c)=(˙ Gc/Gc). Hence, from (2.5) and (2.6) we
may write
φ =









where φ ≡ ˙ c/c = ˙ Gc/Gc. To make progress on this expression, we shall need
to solve for the equilibrium behaviour of GI. We do this under various assump-
tions about the constraints that impinge on the government’s behaviour. The
ﬁr s tr e g i m ew ea n a l y s ei so n ew h e r et h eg o v e r n m e n tc h o o s e st h eﬁscal variables
to maximise the utility of a representative agent, respecting the agent’s and its
own ﬂow budget constraints. We label this the DGBC regime (standing for the
dynamic government budget constraint). The second regime we analyse is one
where the Golden Rule of Public Finance (GRPF) is in place. This rule in eﬀect
places an additional restriction on the government such as to constrain the level
of Gc at some arbitrary level. Finally we compare the outcomes under these
decentralised equilibria with the outcome under the social optimum and enquire
whether the GRPF is welfare enhancing or not.
2.1.1. The Benevolent Government’s Problem under the DGBC
We note that the ﬂow budget constraint, at the economy-wide level, is:
˙ B = rB + Gc + GI − τ(Y + rB). (2.12)
This expression, in per capita terms, enters the maximisation of the benevolent
government. The Hamiltonian may then be written as







−ρt + λ[(1 − τ)(y + rb) − c]
+ µ[rb+ GI + Gc − τ(y + rb)],
8where the two side constraints may be combined to show that when aggregated
up, Y = ˙ K + Gc + GI + C, as we require of any ﬁscal plan. As we show below
at an optimum λ = −µ, so that the government’s plan does indeed respect the





−ρt = −µ; (2.13)







−λ(y + rb)=µ(y + rb). (2.15)
Since λ = −µ implies (∂y/∂GI)=1 ,we ﬁnd that





(2.13) can be manipulated as we did above using (2.4) to yield an expression
for the balanced growth path of the economy. Since this remains a decentralised






where we have used (2.16) to substitute out for GI.
2.1.2. The Benevolent Government’s Problem under the GRPF
Under what we here call the ‘golden rule of public ﬁnance’ (GRPF) we constrain
the government such that it can only borrow for productive spending purposes,
i.e., to boost the supply of GI.T h eq u a n t i t yGc + rB must then be met out of
period taxation. If we assume that Gc + rB does not exhaust all the period tax
take then it follows that
GI =( 1− θ)τ(Y + rB)+ ˙ B, (2.19)
where 0 <θ<1, ˙ B ≥ 0. Our formulation of the GRPF follows Ghosh and Mour-
mouras (2004b), which in turn follows the formulation in Greiner and Semmler
(2000). It is motivated directly by the institutional arrangements in Germany
a n dt h eU K .W en o t et h a tw em a yn o tn o wr e g a r dGc as a choice variable. The
9equilibrium value of bond holdings (as captured by the equilibrium value of the
costate variable), and the equilibrium value of r (as determined by the production
technology), combine with θ (which is parametrically given) and means that Gc
is eﬀectively determined by residual. In this case, we ﬁnd that λ = −ν(1 − θ).I t
follows that
GI = β(1 − θ)Y, (2.20)
and
Gc = θτ(Y + rB) − rB. (2.21)
Along the balanced growth path, as before (˙ c/c)=(˙ Gc/Gc),w eh a v et h a t
φ =




The key distortion associated with the GRPF is that the social cost of a unit of
public investment is higher under the GRPF as opposed to the DGBC (compare
(2.20) with (2.16)). Under the GRPF a higher θ is associated with a higher
marginal social cost as it implies higher (non-productive) current spending. When
θ =0 , the social cost is the lowest (= 1) because all spending by the government
is for productive purposes. Next, comparing the GRPF (with θ =0 ,w h e r e
all spending is for productive purposes) with the balanced budget case of Barro
(1990) with only productive spending, the social cost is 1 for both, as should
intuitively be the case. In terms of social cost, the ‘problem’ with the GRPF
is that (unless θ =0 ) ,t h eg o v e r n m e n ti se a r m a r k i n gs o m ee x p e n d i t u r ef o rn o n -
productive purposes at the outset, whereas under the DGBC, it is not. We note,
however, that this does not mean that Gc cannot be higher under the DGBC, ex
post. This will be apparent in the simulations that we report below. This also
d o e sn o ti m p l yt h a tt h eo p t i m a lv a l u eo fθ is zero, since Gc enters utility directly
and so the marginal utility of Gc rises as Gc falls. It is also intuitively clear that
θ =1 , is also not optimal as that implies a zero level of output. Consequently,
optimal θ lies in the open unit interval.
2.2. The Social Optimum
We now compare the above outturns with the result of a social planning optimum.






GI = βY. (2.24)
The interest rate is given by










We compare balanced growth under the social optimum (φSO) with the out turn








β(1 − θ)βy0β − ρ
σ
. (2.27)
We ﬁnd that growth under the social planner is higher than the other regimes so
long as the following conditions obtain. If the capital share is larger than the tax
distortion
(1 − β) > (1 − τ), (2.28)
then we ﬁnd that φSO >φ DGBC. Furthermore, if it is also the case that







then we ﬁnd that
φSO >φ GRPF >φ DGBC. (2.30)
This ordering of the growth rates is plausible but by no means inevitable. If the
debt level under the DGBC is substantially higher than under the GRPF, then
taxes will need to be somewhat higher to repay the debt plus interest payments on
the outstanding stock of debt. Moreover, the GRPF, insofar as it constrains public
consumption, ought to reduce taxes which are the only source of ﬁnancing such
spending. Besides, the fact that the public investment to output ratio is smaller
under the GRPF should also have an eﬀect in lowering taxes. Indeed, numerical
simulations of the model suggest that the ordering in (2.35) is the likely ordering,
as we shall see below.
112.3. Simulations and discussion of results
Table 1 displays the results of some simulations of the above model economies (the
appendix explains how we constructed these numerical solutions). As compared
with the case of the DGBC and the Social Optimum, the level of productive
investment is somewhat lower under the GRPF, which implies for a given capital
stock a somewhat lower level of period output. This lower level of GI is consistent
with a higher level of private consumption, ceteris paribus, but can imply a sharp
contraction in GC, as in Table 1, suggesting oﬀsetting implications for utility.
The smaller size of the public sector under the GRPF may imply lower period
taxation, and higher equilibrium growth. But a lower level of GI implies a lower
real interest rate. Table 1 displays, for a particular parameterization, how these
various factors play out.
Note that even though the level of output is the same under the social optimum
(SO) and the DGBC (factor inputs are the same — capital is inherited from the
last period while the optimal level of GI i st h es a m ei nb o t hs e t - u p s ) ,t h er a t e
of interest diﬀers. Under the DGBC, people do not take into account the fact
that their individual production decisions create congestion eﬀects, which explains
the higher real interest rate, while under the social planner, internalisation of
the congestion eﬀect causes a lower interest rate, but a higher long-run growth
rate. (Under the DGBC, distortionary taxation scales down the growth eﬀect
considerably, as the numbers demonstrate.) Private consumption is consequently
lower under the SO, but still the present discounted value of utility is higher under
the planner because of the higher growth rate.
Table 1. Congested Production Only
DGBC GRPF Social Optimum
Output 2.873 2.354 2.873
Private Consumption 1.172 1.237 1.022
Government Consumption 0.293 0.042 0.256
Government Investment 0.718 0.324 0.718
Real Interest Rate 0.144 0.118 0.108
Tax Rate 0.380 0.192
Growth Rate 0.035 0.038 0.044
Value Function -20.659 -27.603 -20.215
Parameter values/initializations: A =0 .33,β =0 .25,σ=2 ,η=0 .2,ρ=0 .02,θ=
0.45,K(0) = 20 and B(0) = 1.5.6
6We carried out extensive robustness exercises of all of our numerical simulations and an
12In this set-up, the GRPF can actually deliver a higher growth rate (which is
closer to the SO) than under the DGBC, so long as the ratio of current spending to
taxes (θ)i sn o tt o oh i g h 7. Given our other parameters/initial values, even a value
of θ close to 0.60 can result in a growth rate that is higher than under the DGBC.
This is because of the much lower government consumption8 and tax rate implied
by the GRPF. Clearly, the value of θ has a bearing on the present discounted value
(PDV) of utility through its impact on C and GC.Ah i g h e rv a l u eo fθ will tend to
increase utility directly by raising, ceteris paribus, GC (although it also crowds out
private consumption). A higher value of θ also reduces output below what it would
otherwise have been, by reducing GI, and it also acts directly to lower the growth
rate, by lowering the rate of interest. However, since Gc = θτ(Y + rB) − rB,
this implies a somewhat lower level of taxes, and growth ends up higher under the
GRPF than under the DGBC.
While the numbers presented in the table show that welfare is higher under
the DGBC than under the GRPF, it is theoretically possible to have the opposite
for certain values of θ. One thing that emerges quite clearly from the numbers
for the model with congestion in production is that under the GRPF, for a large
range of plausible values for θ, the real interest rate and growth rate are closer to
the SO than under the DGBC.
3. A Simple Model of Excessive Private Consumption
As we indicated in the introduction, the public ﬁnance literature suggests majority
voting can lead to a level of public good provision either systematically above or
below the social optimum level. In practice this means the sum of marginal utilities
will diﬀer from that implied under the ‘Samuelson Rule’. In our set up we model
this as a deviation in the marginal rate of substitution from what it would be
appendix is available on request. These conﬁrmed the basic results that we discuss now and in
the rest of the paper. Brieﬂy, we allowed A to vary between 0.1 and 0.6, β to vary between 0.1
and 0.4, σ to vary between 0.5 and 5, η t ov a r yb e t w e e n0 . 1a n d0 . 4 ,ρ to vary beween 0.005 and
0.1, K(0) between 5 and 50, and B(0) between 0.5 and 15. In addition θ was varied between
0.25 and 0.65.
7We note that θ =0 .45 is consistent with the deﬁcit:GDP ratio being in the region of 2-2.5%.
Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004a) ﬁnd that this is approximately the optimal ratio of current
non-productive spending (including interest payments) to tax revenue in a similar set-up to that
here for an average tax rate of around 0.3.
8Note that the link between C and GC as given by eq. (2.17) no longer exists, and GC in
general rises with θ.
13under the social optimum. For a given level of (Gc/c),w eh a v et h a t
MRSc <MR S SO,
where MRSc denotes the marginal rate of substitution in the excess private con-
sumption case, and MRSSO denotes the marginal rate of substitution in the social




























This utility function will generate a decentralised equilibrium, under benevo-
lent government, where private consumption is excessive.9 In such an environment
we might not expect to see beneﬁcial results from ﬁscal rules where the ultimate
aim is to constrain the government in some way. One may think this since it will
be private behaviour, not the government’s behaviour, that is diﬀerent from the
outcome under the social optimum. However, that intuition may not go through.
We are in a second-best world and as the previous simulation results demonstrated
the GRPF may act to reduce private consumption.
9The following quote from Galbraith is a somewhat colourful exposition of these types of
concerns. "The family which takes its mauve and cerise, air-conditioned, power-steered and
power-braked automobile out for a tour passes through cities that are badly paved, made hideous
by litter, blighted buildings, billboards and posts for wires that should long since have been put
underground. They pass on into a countryside that has been rendered largely invisible by
commercial art...They picnic on exquisitely packaged food from a portable icebox by a polluted
stream and go on to spend the night at a park which is a menace to public health and morals.
Just before dozing oﬀ on air mattress, beneath a nylon tent, amid the stench of decaying refuse,
they may reﬂect on the curious unevenness of their blessings." (The Aﬄuent Society, page 192).
143.1. The Decentralised Outcome
T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n t ’ so p t i m a l i t yc o n d i t i o n si nt h i sc a s ei n c l u d e









= −˙ λ; (3.3)
λ(1 − τ)r = −˙ λ. (3.4)
Once again, these last two equations can be combined to yield an equation for the
interest rate that we may use when we calculate the balanced growth path from







An expression for balanced growth is found using (3.2) and the interest rate. Since









Once we ﬁnd the optimal GI we can clarify the implications of this expression
further.
3.1.1. The Benevolent Government’s problem under the DGBC
In this case we envisage a benevolent government choosing government expendi-
ture and taxation such as to maximise the representative agent’s utility, as we did














−λ(y + rb) − µ(y + rb)=0 . (3.9)
15These are combined to yield, at the aggregate level
GI = βY; (3.10)
Gc =
η − γ
1 − η + γ
. (3.11)
Equation (3.11) reveals a key result: private consumption is excessive when com-
p a r e dt o( 2 . 1 7 ) ,a n da sc o m p a r e dw i t ht he social optimum for this economy. The






3.1.2. The Benevolent Government’s Problem under the GRPF
In this section we employ the GRPF, as in section 2, to analyse the implications
for growth and welfare. As before θ pins down, in eﬀect, the feasible level of Gc,








−ν(1 − θ)(y + rb) − λ(y + rb)=0 . (3.14)
Since λ = −ν(1 − θ),w eh a v et h a t




0 + rB) − rB. (3.16)
Balanced growth is diﬀerent to the decentralised solution under the DGBC since





It follows then that,
φ =




163.2. The Social Optimum
The results under the social optimum are as before. The optimality conditions
include:






Since the social planner internalises all externalities in this economy, the produc-
tion technology is described by Y = AK1−βG
β
I. T h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei st h e ng i v e n
by





Balanced growth is derived in the usual wa y .W ec o m p a r et h et h eb a l a n c e dg r o w t h
















The same basic considerations seem to apply here, as before in section 2. The
important, and perhaps surprising, thing to note here is that although the GRPF
appears to be addressing the ‘wrong’ problem (it is constraining Gc when it is c
that is excessive), it nevertheless has the ability to deliver a higher growth rate, as
before, because it makes possible a lower level of distortionary taxes. However, as
b e f o r e ,t h i sh i g h e rg r o w t hr a t en e e dn o tb ei n f o r m a t i v ea st ot h ew e l f a r er a n k i n g s
of these ﬁscal regimes, as the simulation results in the next section make clear.
3.3. Simulations and discussion of results
Comparing the numbers in Table 2 with those in Table 1 for the case where
the DGBC is in place, it is clear that private consumption is higher and this is
quite intuitive, as in this case agents do not take into account the fact that if
17they increase their individual consumption (c) out of the public good (GC), then
this increases the overall (C/GC) ratio for the economy. So C is higher and GC
lower than the benchmark case of Table 1. The nature of the congestion on the
production side remains the same as in Table 1, which gives rise to identical real
rates of interest in the two cases. Given this (together with identical Y and GI
and lower GC), the tax rate has to be lower in Table 2, which implies that the
growth rate is higher. The values with the GRPF in place will, of course, remain
unchanged from Table 1, but it is clear from the numbers that if there is congestion
in consumption as well as in production, then this gives rise to values of C, GC,
τ and φ that are closer to the GRPF numbers than where there is congestion in
production alone. The PDV of utility could go either way. Where the DGBC is
in place, C is higher and GC lower in Table 2 than in Table 1. This means that
t h ev a l u e so fU and φ are closer to those attained under the GRPF10.




Private Consumption 1.252 1.237
Government Consumption 0.139 0.042
Government Investment 0.718 0.324
Real Interest Rate 0.144 0.118
Tax Rate 0.329 0.192
Growth Rate 0.038 0.038
Value Function -21.299 -27.603
See Table 1 for additional parameter settings
4. A Simple Model of Excessive Public Consumption
The utility function of the previous section was intended to capture what many
might argue is a risk in modern economies; private agents not internalising all the
implications of their consumption plans. One important upshot of this was that,
relative to the social optimum, we encountered excessive private consumption.
However, a natural question to ask is how the economy behaves in the presence
of the GRPF when the decentralised equilibrium is characterised by excessive
10The possibility of the two ﬁscal regimes delivering very similar outcomes is clearly enhanced
when we have congestion in both production and consumption.
18public consumption, i.e., excessive Gc. In other words, here the GRPF not only
may allow higher growth via lower distortionary taxation, but may also address
directly an externality. In this section we work with a utility function which
implies the decentralised equilibrium is characterised by excessive Gc,f o rw h i c h
it is the case that
MRSGc = −
µ






Figure 8.1 again displays the diﬀering MRS0s in the present case, the case of










We assume that 1−η−γ>0. This utility function basically implies that private
agents underestimate the marginal utility of private consumption relative to that
of the public good—the congestion eﬀect goes in the opposite direction to the
previous section.
The decentralised equilibrium is characterised by the following pair of relations:
Gc =
η + γ
1 − η − γ
C; (4.2)
GI = βY. (4.3)
As suggested, the implication is that, relative to the social optimum, there is an
excess of government consumption.
Under the GRPF the following pair of equilibrium relations obtain:
GI = β(1 − θ)Y ; (4.4)
Gc = θτ(Y + rB) − rB. (4.5)
4.1. Simulations and discussion of results
Comparing Table 3 with Table 1, it is clear that as regards the DGBC case,
excessive unproductive government spending shows up in higher GC,l o w e rC,
higher τ,a n dl o w e rφ in Table 3. Theoretically, the value function could go either
19way. In this case, the GRPF makes a bigger diﬀerence to the outcome in terms of
reducing government consumption and the tax rate, as is expected of a restrictive
ﬁscal rule in the presence of excessive public consumption. So the numbers clearly
indicate that if a higher growth rate is the objective, then there is a strong case
in favour of the GRPF when there is excessive GC.
Table 3a. Congested Production and Excessive Gc (γ =0 .1)
DGBC GRPF
Output 2.873 2.354
Private Consumption 1.083 1.237
Government Consumption 0.464 0.042
Government Investment 0.718 0.324
Real Interest Rate 0.144 0.118
Tax Rate 0.438 0.192
Growth Rate 0.030 0.038
Value Function -21.711 -27.603
See Table 1 for additional parameter settings
Table 3b. Congested Production and Excessive Gc (γ =0 .6)
DGBC GRPF
Output 2.873 2.354
Private Consumption 0.431 1.237
Government Consumption 1.723 0.042
Government Investment 0.718 0.324
Real Interest Rate 0.144 0.118
Tax Rate 0.860 0.192
Growth Rate 0.000 0.038
Value Function -87.787 -27.603
See Table 1 for additional parameter settings
T h el a r g e ri st h ev a l u et a k e nb yγ,t h es t r o n g e ri st h ec a s ef o rt h eG R P F .A s
regards the impact on welfare, the eﬀects of higher φ and C attainable under the
GRPF are balanced by the lower GC, as such public services add to utility. But
even here, a suﬃciently large value of γ can generate quite small utility-values in
the DGBC case, and this can be bettered under the GRPF regime. This is clear
from Table 3b, where γ =0 .6 results in a utility value that is much lower than is
achievable under the DGBC.
205. A Simple Model of Insuﬃcient Private Investment
We considered — till section 3 — various cases where the benevolent government was
choosing ﬁscal policy to maximise the welfare of the representative agent, and was
in many cases not able to internalise the externalities, where there was congestion
in production and some distortion to consumption, or both. Section 4 considered
the case where the government was spending excessively on public consumption
compared to what it would have spent, had the social planner undertaken the
s a m ea c t i v i t y .T h i sp r o v i d e sar a t i o n a l ef o rh a v i n gt h eG R P Fi nt h eﬁrst place,
as one of the key elements of the GRPF is to restrict the source of funding of
government consumption to taxes alone. The analysis of what happens under the
GRPF is carried out through simulations, as under the GRPF — with GC not
being a choice variable — we do not have the proportional relationship between
GC and C, that we have under the DGBC (and the social planner’s outcome).
In this section, we deal with the other issue in the context of the DGBC: under
what circumstances is there insuﬃcient private investment under the benevolent
government (when compared to the planning outcome), and can the GRPF bring
public investment more in line with what the social planner would achieve? This
situation is reﬂected in Figure 8.2 where the ‘distorted’ marginal rate of technical
substitution is lower than in the baseline case of the congested production function.
The marginal rate of technical substitution for the Social Optimum would lie in
between these two cases, at the point of intersection. First, we formulate a certain
speciﬁcation of production function with congestion which gives rise to the interest
rate (i.e., marginal productivity of capital) being lower under the DGBC than
under the planner. When we involve the GRPF, the ﬁrst order condition for
optimal public services (i.e., link between GI and Y ) remains the same as before,
and the issue has to be sorted through simulations.





I , 1 − β − ζ>0. (5.1)
This implies that the interest rate is given by:




Clearly, since the social planner internalises the externalities, his production func-





21The interest rate in this case is given by:




Comparing (5.4) with (5.2), it is clear that the benevolent government, operating
under the DGBC, achieves a lower marginal return to capital compared to the
social planner. Note that in both cases, the ﬁrst order condition for public services
is given by ∂Y/∂GI =1 , but the interest rate diﬀers because the production
functions are diﬀerent. Note that in Model 1, the individual production function
diﬀers from the aggregate, and yet we have (GI/y)∗ being the same in the DGBC
regime as in the SO. However, here with similar production function characteristics
(as regards disortions), we now have (GI/y)∗
DGBC > (GI/y)∗
SO.
Using ∂Y/∂GI =1in both cases gives us expressions for r and GI that are as
follows:
r =( 1 − β − ζ)Ak
−β[(β + ζ)y]
β; (5.2’)
GI =( β + ζ)y,
under the DGBC, and




under the social planner.
Now, when we introduce the GRPF, the (congested) production function re-
mains as in (5.1), but the government budget constraint must take into account
the fact that borrowing (if any) is for public investment purposes only. Because
of this, the optimality condition for public services becomes ∂Y/∂GI =1 /(1−θ).
Consequently, we ﬁnd:
r =( 1 − β − ζ)Ak
−β[(β + ζ)(1 − θ)y
0]
β; (5.5)
GI =( β + ζ)(1− θ)y
0.
It may appear that r is lower in (5.5) than (5.2’). But this is not necessarily true,
despite the fact that it is lower under the GRPF than under the DGBC (and
under the social planner). The reason for this is that output is endogenous, and
y0 c o u l db eh i g h e ro rl o w e rt h a ny in equilibrium.
GI = β(1 − θ)Y ;
Gc = θτ(Y + rB) − rB.
225.1. Simulations and discussion of results
First, comparing the DGBC with the SO, it is clear that the growth rate and
the real interest rate are both lower under the DGBC, which is quite intuitive,
given the ‘underinvestment’. Mainly as a result of the considerably lower growth
rate, the PDV of welfare is lower under the DGBC (although C and GC are
higher). Comparing the values for the diﬀerent variables under the DGBC with
those under congested production only, our benchmark case (Table 1), we ﬁnd
that φ is much further away from the SO in Table 4 than Table 1. Also, while
r i sh i g h e rt h a nt h eS Ov a l u ei nT a b l e1 ,h e r ei ti sl o w e r . T h i st o oi si n t u i t i v e ,
given that here there is underinvestment, while in the previous case there was
too much private investment as agents were ignoring the congestion eﬀects. As
expected, the ‘underinvestment’ case generates higher private consumption than
the ‘overinvestment’ case.
Table 4. Insuﬃcient Private Investment
DGBC GRPF Social Optimum
Output 3.495 2.864 2.873
Private Consumption 1.360 1.452 1.022
Government Consumption 0.340 0.446 0.256
Government Investment 1.573 0.709 0.718
Real Interest Rate 0.096 0.079 0.108
Tax Rate 0.561 0.420
Growth Rate 0.011 0.013 0.044
Value Function -31.183 -26.566 -20.215
ζ =0 .2. See Table 1 for additional parameter settings
C o m p a r i n gn o wt h eo u t c o m e su n d e rt h eD G B Ca n dt h eG R P Fi nT a b l e4 ,w e
ﬁnd that in this case the GRPF seems to deliver a signiﬁcantly better outcome,
both in terms of growth and welfare. For a plausible value of θ equal to 0.45,
the tax rate is lower, the growth rate is higher, consumption is higher and welfare
higher than under the DGBC. The lower real interest rate (and consequently, lower
interest payments on debt) under the GRPF enables the tax rate to be lower, and
this leads to both a higher growth rate and higher current consumption. It is
interesting to see that in the underinvestment case, the GRPF (for a wide range
of values of θ) gives rise to values of the growth rate and welfare that are closer
to the social optimum than is possible under the DGBC.
We note that what drives the lower interest rate in Table 4 under the DGBC,
as compared with the DGBC case reported in Table 1, is the fact that the total
23capital stock is somewhat higher under the former set up. For example, for the
model economy reported in Table 1 we ﬁnd that [(GI + ∆K)/Y]=0 .494, while
for the model reported in Table 4 we have that [(GI + ∆K)/Y]=0 .513.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we attempted to analyse the eﬀects of two diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes on
key macroeconomic variables within a framework of congestion in production and
distortions to private consumption, and to relate these to the social optimum.
Comparing outcomes under the DGBC it is clear that private consumption is
higher and government consumption lower when there is congestion in production
and distortions to consumption, than when there is congestion in production alone
(what we labelled the ‘benchmark case’). The GRPF regime can make a signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence to the growth rate in the benchmark case, though the DGBC, by
‘trading’ more private for public consumption comes closer to the GRPF in terms
of the eﬀects on key macroeconomic variables. We then introduced the excessive
government consumption case, and found that a restrictive ﬁscal regime like the
GRPF can bring about a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to the growth rate. Despite public
consumption being in the utility function, the GRPF regime can, through a rise
in private consumption, a fall in the tax rate and rise in the growth rate, bring
about higher welfare in certain cases. Finally, in the underinvestment case the
GRPF can perhaps make the biggest diﬀerence. Growth, welfare, and a number
of other key macro-variables are more likely to be closer to the social optimum
than when the DGBC is in place.
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267. Numerical Solution of the Model
The models that we analyse in this paper have a simple structure (that is almost
recursive) that we can exploit in our numerical calculations. First we note that
from period zero onwards, the economy always lies on the balanced growth path.
Consequently, once we have found the growth rate for the economy, and given
k(0) and b(0), we can easily solve for the path of all of the prices and quantities
in our model, reducing the model ultimately to two equations in two unknowns.
We consider the case of the decentralised equilibrium under the dynamic gov-
ernment budget constraint. The other cases that we analyse in the paper result
in more or less straightforward changes to this example.
Given the capital stock, k(0), and the fact that G(t)I = βy(t),w em a yc a l c u l a t e







φ =[ ( 1− τ(t))φ
0 − (ρ/σ)τ(t)].
Along the balanced growth path it follows that for a variable X(t),
˙ X(t)/X(t)=[ ( 1− τ(t))φ
0 − (ρ/σ)τ(t)].
Hence, we may write the agent’s budget constraint and the government’s budget
constraint as follows:
[(1 − τ(t))φ




w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dG(t)I = βy(t) and G(t)c =( η/1+η)c(t). (7.1) and (7.2) com-
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